According to US data over the period from 1994 to 2008, in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on residual real wage inequality, and this e¤ect primarily operates through a stronger negative e¤ect on low wages relative to high wages. To explain this e¤ect, we introduce random matching and wage posting into the framework by Berensen, Menzio and Wright (2011). In the model, uncoordinated job searches by workers give rise to an equilibrium in which …rms are matched with zero, one or multiple job applicants. This mechanism generates wage dispersion among identical workers. In ‡ation in ‡uences the wage distribution directly through its in ‡uence on the real pro…ts of …rms and indirectly through a spillover e¤ect. Quantitatively, the calibrated model can explain approximately two-thirds of the observed adjustment of wage dispersion in response to changes in in ‡ation.
Introduction
The in ‡uence of in ‡ation on wage inequality is one of the most extensively researched topics in monetary economics and labor economics. Although many studies have focused on the relationship between in ‡ation and real wage inequality (for example, Hammermesh, 1986; Erikson and Ichino, 1995; Bulir, 2001 ), the e¤ect of in ‡ation on the residual real wage School of Economics, University of Sydney, NSW, Australia. inequality has received little attention in the literature. In this paper, we develop a searchtheoretic general equilibrium model to study the e¤ect of in ‡ation on real wage inequality among identical workers, which is called residual wage inequality in the labor literature.
The empirical motivation for this study is as follows: existing empirical work that examine the relationship between in ‡ation and residual wage inequality are sparse and outdated. In this paper, we provide the most recent empirical evidence for the relationship between these two variables. We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data at quarterly frequency for the period from 1994 to 2008. 1 Since 1994, the CPS provides worker-level information on a variety of demographic characteristics and features of jobs, which enables us to measure residual wage inequality as precisely as possible. Following the labor literature, we construct residual wage distribution after controlling for the observed di¤erences in workers and jobs and then calculate our measure of residual real wage inequality. In our benchmark case, residual wage inequality is de…ned as the ratio of high wages (the 75th percentile of the wage distribution) to low wages (the 25th percentile of the wage distribution). Our constructed residual wage inequality is approximately 1:54, which is fairly close to various measures in recent studies. For example, Hornstein et al (2011) reports mean -min ratios between 1:5 and 2 based on the 2000 OES survey and the 1967-1996 waves of the PDIS survey. In terms of its relationship with in ‡ation, we …nd that residual real wage inequality is positively correlated with in ‡ation after controlling for labor productivity. The data suggests that when in ‡ation is doubled, the wage inequality increases by 1:23 percent. This result remains robust when di¤erent measures of wage inequality are used. In addition, when we examine the in ‡uence of in ‡ation on di¤erent wage levels, we …nd that a change in in ‡ation negatively a¤ects low wages more than high wages, and this result suggests that a change in real wage inequality is primarily driven by a decrease in the low wage.
Theoretically, this paper contributes to the literature in that it develops a search-theoretic general equilibrium monetary framework to address two important issues: the reason that 1 We chose to use data through September of 2008 because the global …nancial crisis that peaked in late 2008 and early 2009 resulted in a signi…cant decline in economic activity and prolonged unemployment.
wage inequality exists among identical workers and the manner in which a change in in‡ation a¤ects residual wage inequality. In studying the …rst issue, the existing literature either relies on on-the-job searches, such as Kumar (2008) , or uses a two-tier unemployment insurance system, such as Albrecht and Vroman (2001) , to generate wage inequality among homogenous workers. In this paper we adopt a di¤erent approach: wage inequality results from uncoordinated job searches in a frictional labor market. Speci…cally, we incorporate uncoordinated job searches into the model of Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011; henceforth, BMW). The labor market in our model features a variation of the large economy with random matching and wage posting as presented in Julien, Kennes and King (2000) . We assume that …rms are capacity constrained in the sense that each …rm has only one vacancy and that this vacancy can be o¤ered to a maximum of one unemployed worker. Firms that are seeking to hire workers post a menu of wages that they are willing to pay to attract applicants.
Workers subsequently choose to apply to one and only one …rm while being ignorant of the decision of other workers. The uncoordinated nature of the job-search process implies that some …rms attract multiple applicants, whereas others do not. This mechanism generates wage inequality among identical workers. Speci…cally, a menu posted by a searching …rm consists of two wage levels: a high wage and a low wage. When only one worker approaches a searching …rm, we assume that this worker holds all of the wage determination power and extracts all of the gains from a match with a high wage. Thus, the high wage is the wage at which the …rm is indi¤erent between employing the worker and not employing the worker (and thus being inactive). By contrast, if more than one worker approaches a …rm, then only one of the applying workers successfully forms an employment match. Competition between applicants for the sole position results in the …rm extracting all gains from the match by o¤ering a low wage. The low wage is the wage at which the successful applicant is indi¤erent between working and not working. In equilibrium, the low wage is a weighted average of the high wage and the value of non-market activities encountered by an unemployed worker (primarily unemployment insurance (UI) bene…ts in our model).
For the second issue, we conclude that changes in in ‡ation positively a¤ect wage inequality among identical workers, as observed in the data. The central insight of the mechanism that delivers this positive relationship lies on a spillover e¤ect. In the context of high in‡ation, the real pro…ts of …rms decrease, which directly reduces the high wage (high wage is equal to real pro…ts) and thus, decreases the low wage. In addition, the decrease in real pro…ts in the goods market reduces the incentives of …rms to post vacancies in the labor market, which translates into a tighter labor market condition and makes workers less likely to locate a high-wage job. We refer to this e¤ect as a spillover e¤ect (a spillover from the goods market to the labor market). The spillover e¤ect moves the low wages closer to the amount of UI bene…ts, which further reduces the low wages.
We then calibrate the model to the US data and quantify the steady-state e¤ect of in ‡ation on wage inequality and on wage levels. In the baseline calibration, our model can account for 80 percent of the observed moments in low wages, and the predicted reaction of high wage is also fairly close to its empirical counterpart. When we deviate from the baseline case by lowering UI bene…ts by increasing the mark-up ratio and convexity of the cost function, our model can generate a 0:76 percent increase in wage inequality when in ‡ation is doubled; this increase, is approximately two-thirds of the observed adjustments in wage inequality (1:23 percent) in the data.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature on the relationship between in ‡ation and wage inequality cited earlier, and we note that most of these studies explore the relationship for the period prior to 1990. 2 Generally, this empirical literature has reported a negative relationship between in ‡ation and wage inequality, which di¤ers from our results and contradicts the …ndings of the theoretical literature. In the theoretical literature, some existing works (e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) , Benabou (1988 Benabou ( , 1992 , and Diamond (1993)) as-2 Hammermesh (1986) analyzes the relationship above by using 20 two-digit manufacturing industries for the 1955-1981 period in the United States. He …nds that greater in ‡ation reduces the dispersion in relative wage changes. Similar …ndings are reported in Italy by Erikson and Ichino (1995) , who study metal-manufacturing …rms for the 1976-1990 period. However, Bulir (2001) argues for a positive relationship between these two variables using cross-country data.
sume that because of the nominal rigidity, …rms follow a [s; S] strategy in wage setting. The aforementioned authors propose that an increase in the rate of in ‡ation increases wage dispersion. However, the existence of rigidities is responsible for these …ndings. The mechanism at work in our model is much richer and subtler: an increase in in ‡ation reduces the real pro…ts of …rms, and such decreased pro…ts directly lower both high wages and low wages.
In addition, a lower real pro…t causes …rms to post fewer vacancies in the labor market. A tighter labor market reduces the probability of a worker …nding a high-wage job. This decreased probability incurs further downward pressure on the low wage by moving this wage in the direction of UI bene…t amounts. As a result, wage inequality increases. An additional problem with existing models is that they lack a microfoundation for money. Such models cannot address many questions, such as the question as to why money acts as a medium of exchange. In this paper, we explicitly model the frictions that render money "essential" (i.e., higher social welfare can be achieved through the use of money than without it.)
The paper that is most closely related to our work is the research of Kumar (2008) , who also explores the connection between in ‡ation and residual wage inequality in a search model. However, our paper di¤ers from his work in several ways. First, Kumar (2008) relies on on-the-job searches to generate wage inequality among identical workers, whereas in our model, such wage inequality results from an uncoordinated job search in a large labor market. Second, our paper examines in ‡ation and residual wage inequality information, whereas Kumar (2008) , and the majority of the existing literature (for example, Hammermesh, 1986), considers only the relationship between wage inequality and in ‡ation. The distinction between wage inequality and residual wage inequality is crucial in a model with homogenous workers, which is the case in Kumar (2008) and in our model. In this sense, we argue that residual wage inequality is a more appropriate measure of wage inequality among identical workers. Third, Kumar (2008) does not study the model's empirical performance; in contrast, we conduct a quantitative analysis to examine the model …t.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the key facts characterizing the relationship among wages, residual wage inequality and in ‡ation for the period from 1994 to 2008. Section 3 develops a model based on BMW but with uncoordinated searches in the labor market. Equilibrium is established, and key properties governing the relationship between wages and in ‡ation are discussed. Section 4 calibrates the model to the data in the US. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data and Facts
The data source that we use is the Current Population Survey (CPS wage for an individual's main job (in log), and we control for gender, race, marital status, education, experience (age minus years of education minus …ve), industry, occupation, a 3 The CPS data that are used in this work date back to 1989. The reason for excluding data before 1994 is that the data on hourly wages (main jobs) that are used to construct the residual wage dispersion are not available for the 1989-1993 period. The data on wages that are available during this period refer to hourly earnings, which di¤ers from hourly wages in several respects. First, hourly earnings contain hourly wages, tips, commissions and other types of compensation. Second, the question regarding hourly earnings is answered by any member of a family, whereas hourly wages measure wage rates received by a family head. Third, hourly earnings re ‡ect earnings in all jobs, whereas hourly wages only re ‡ect information from one's primary job. Because of these di¤erences, we exclude the data before 1994. dummy for union members, and the interaction between occupation and experience to capture occupation-speci…c tenure pro…les. This procedure provides us a time series of residual nominal hourly wage. Second, we divide the residual nominal wage by the consumer price index. The resulting series is the residual real wage (in log). Finally, we use an exponent with a base of e to "undo" the logarithm. We convert the residual real wage (in log) back to its standard value because this method ensures positive wage inequality as de…ned below.
We now calculate our indices of wage inequality. In the benchmark case, we de…ne high wage and low wage as, respectively, the 75th (wage75) and 25th percentiles (wage25) of the residual real wage in quarter t = 1; :::; T . Our measure of wage inequality (W I75) in quarter t is given by W I75 t = wage75 t wage25 t : Figure 1 shows scatter plots between W I75 and quarterly CPI in ‡ation. It is evident that there exists a positive relationship between these two variables.
Figure 1 In ‡ation and Wage Inequality
Because low wages are likely to be subject to outliers, as a check of robustness, we also consider four other measures of wage inequality, namely, W I80, W I85, W I90 and W I95, which are equal to the high wage (80%, 85%, 90% and 95% percentiles of the residual wage distribution, respectively) divided by the corresponding low wage (20%, 15%, 10% and 5%
percentiles of the residual wage distribution, respectively). The results show that the positive relationship between in ‡ation and wage inequality is robust across all of these four cases. In the second step, we more closely examine this relationship, especially the e¤ects of in ‡ation on high wage and low wage. We run three regressions separately for each quarter.
Each regression has the following general form log(Y t ) = 0 + 1 log(inf lation t ) + 2 log(productivity t ), where Y t is the high wage, low wage and wage inequality. Productivity refers to labor productivity, which is measured by output per worker in the business sector. 4 1 is the coe¢ cient of interest, and it measures the elasticity of high wages, low wages, and wage inequality with respect to in ‡ation. Table 2 reports the regression results of the benchmark case and the four other measures of wage inequality. 4 We include productivity in the regression because it has been widely agreed that productivity a¤ects high wages to a large extent and thus ultimately in ‡uences wage dispersion. Omitting productivity in the regression would cause an endogeneity problem. Table 2 E¤ects of In ‡ation on Wages and Wage Inequality
Variables
High Wage log(wage75) log(wage80) log(wage85) log(wage90) log ( Two …ndings are prominent here: …rst, the positive relationship between in ‡ation and wage inequality is statistically signi…cant across all …ve cases. In the benchmark case, the elasticity of W I75 with respect to in ‡ation is approximately 0:0123, which suggests that if the in ‡ation rate doubles (e.g., from 2 to 4 percent), then the wage inequality will increase by 1:23 percent. Second, although in ‡ation a¤ects both high wages and low wages negatively, it is clear that the negative e¤ect is much stronger on low wages than on high wages. The benchmark case shows that a low wage (wage25) will decrease by 0:38 percent as a result of a 10 percent increase in in ‡ation, whereas a high wage will decrease only by 0:26 percent.
This result suggests that the increased wage inequality in response to an in ‡ation rise is primarily driven by declines in the low wage.
The Model
We now develop a model of frictional markets in which higher anticipated in ‡ation rates cause an increase in wage inequality. The model is based on the search-theoretic general equilibrium monetary model in BMW.
Time is discrete, and agents are in…nitely lived. Each time period is characterized by three distinct markets in which agents meet to conduct economic activity: a decentralized labor market, a decentralized goods market and a centralized goods market. The decentralized labor market is designed in the spirit of the labor search theory of Mortensen and Pissarides This implies that discounting occurs following AD market activity and precedes MP market activity. Money is intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible and storable. The quantity of …at money per capita at the beginning of period t is M t . We assume that M t+1 = (1 + )M t , where is constant and new money is injected by lump-sum transfers to workers in the AD market.
The price of goods in terms of money in the AD is p t . We restrict our attention to steadystate equilibria in which the real value of aggregate money balances M=p is constant. This implies p t+1 = (1 + )p t , and is the in ‡ation rate between this and the next AD market.
To The value functions depend on agent type j 2 fh; f g and employment status e 2 f0; 1; 2g ;
where e = 2 indicates that the agent is currently in a high-wage match in the MP market, e = 1 indicates that the agent is currently in a low-wage match in the MP market, and e = 0 indicates the agent is unmatched in the MP market. Value functions also depend on other state variables that are de…ned below. In the following discussion, we consider a representative period t and discuss details of the three markets.
The MP market: is a random search market in which unemployed workers search for employment and new …rms search for labor. 5 Workers have one indivisible unit of labor service to sell to a …rm during each period. Only unemployed workers search for employment. 5 See the work of Shi (2006) for a discussion of directed search and undirected search.
Firms are able to accommodate only one employee at any given time. If a worker and …rm are combined, then they produce output y. The …rm then sells the output in the LW market and the wage is paid in the AD market. Existing jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate in the MP market.
The design of the MP market is as follows. First, the …rms that are seeking to hire labor post a menu of wages that they are willing to pay to attract applicants. Workers subsequently choose to apply to one and only one …rm while being ignorant of the decision of other workers. The uncoordinated nature of the job-search process implies that some …rms attract multiple applicants, whereas others do not. The menu posted by a searching …rm consists of two wage levels: where w h > w l . When more than one worker approaches a …rm, only one of the applying workers enters an employment match. Each applicant has an equal probability of success.
Competition between applicants for the sole available position results in a …rm extracting all gains from a match. The low wage w l is the wage at which the successful applicant is indi¤erent between working and not working. By contrast, if only one worker approaches a searching …rm, then we assume that this worker holds all of the wage determination bargaining power. Thus, the high wage w h in equilibrium is the wage at which the …rm is indi¤erent between employing the worker and not employing the worker (and thus being inactive). Note that a wage in paid in the AD market even though matching occurs in MP. b is the unemployment bene…t provided by the government in real terms, and b < w l < w h . is the dividend income that is derived from …rm pro…ts, and T is a lump sum tax charged by the government. is a lump sum payment injected by the central bank in each period.
Inserting the budget constraint into (1) yields
where I e = w e + + T is the agent's after-tax income conditional on e. The assumption of quasi-linear utility is crucial here. From (2), it is clear that the optimal choice ofẑ is independent of z and I e but does appear to depend on e through U h e . However, as will be shown later, the LW utility function is independent of e, which makes the derivative ofÛ h e and, hence,ẑ independent of e. Thus, every worker brings the sameẑ out of the AD market; thus, the model is analytically tractable.
In the LW market, agents interact in a decentralized market with anonymous bilateral matching. Once matched, workers and …rms bargain over the terms of trade (q; d), where q and d are the units of goods and real dollars exchanged, respectively. For h with money holdings z and employment status e, the value function is
where h is the probability of h meeting a …rm. We multiply any real balances taken out of the LW market by to obtain their value in the AD market. v(q) is the utility and we assume that v(0) = 0, v 0 > 0 and v 00 < 0.
The probability of trade is a matching function determined by the measure of workers and …rms, denoted by B and S, respectively, who are active in the LW market. The analysis now progresses to the MP market, in which the key features of this paper are located. In the MP market, the value function for h is constructed according to employment
; where e = 1; 2, and
where is the exogenous rate at which MP matches are destroyed. For simplicity, we assume that if a match is destroyed, h cannot gain employment until the next MP market meeting. This description completes the outline of the representative worker's one-period problem.
The three value functions for h can be collapsed into one Bellman equation. Substituting 
where expectation E is the expectation of the next period's employment statusê. Note that the choice ofẑ of worker does not depend on e.
Firms
We now consider the problem of the representative …rm f . Before proceeding to the markets, we must emphasize that only …rms with e = 1; 2 have any need for money. f with e = 1; 2 requires money to pay wages and dividends in the AD market. The money that is necessary for wage and dividend payments is raised each period in the LW and/or AD markets. Thus, f with e = 0; 1; 2 appears to have no need to carry money from the AD market. Considering the MP market …rst, the value function of f is
where f 1 and f 2 are the endogenous rates at which active yet unmatched …rms enter lowand high-wage contracts, respectively. Again, the matching rates Unless otherwise stated, we assume to be linear such that x = y q and c(q) = q. For a …rm entering the LW market with e = 1; 2, where w e for e = 1; 2 is the real wage paid by f . Simplifying, we obtain
, for e = 1; 2;
where R = y + f ( d q) is the expected real revenue that an employed …rm earns during each period. This expression clearly indicates that the expected real revenue is identical for e = 1; 2.
A …rm with e = 0 has no wage obligations and has no output to sell. Such a …rm is considered to be inactive. An inactive …rm is able to enter the next MP market only if it pays a real cost, denoted by k, incurred in the prior AD market. Thus,
. By (6), k can be expressed as
Government
The role of government in this model is of minor importance. The government records a balanced budget in each period. The government collects lump sum taxes from workers, denoted by T ; pays an unemployment bene…t to h with e = 0, denoted by b; and prints money at rate such thatM = (1 + )M , where is the steady-state is in ‡ation. In the budget constraint for h in the AD market, = M=p. The government pays its injection to workers directly. The government budget constraint is bu = T + M=p.
Because we focus on steady-state analysis, by the Fisher equation 1 + i = (1 + )= , we can equivalently describe monetary policy in terms of setting the nominal interest rate i or the growth rate of money .
Equilibrium

The Goods Market
As noted previously, f and h meet and bargain bilaterally over (q; d) in the LW market. Let 2 (0; 1] denote the bargaining power of h. Thus, the Nash bargaining problem is It is not di¢ cult to show that d = z because it is costly to hold cash when we are not at the Friedman rule. The …rst-order condition wrt q is
We are now able to solve the equilibrium in the LW market. Using equation (5), which is essentially the key equation of the LW market and then (i) insertingd =ẑ and @q=@ẑ = =g 1 (q;^ ) by virtue of (8), (ii) using the Fisher equation for the nominal interest rate to eliminate 1=( ^ ) = 1 + i, (iii) inserting the arrival rate^ h = M (1; 1 û), and (iv) imposing a steady state, we arrive at
We refer to equation (9) as the LW curve. Simple conditions guarantee the existence of a unique monetary equilibrium with q > 0 given any u. 7 Routine calculations show that the LW curve is downward sloping, for exactly the same reasons as cited in BMW: for higher values of u, there are fewer …rms with output to sell in the decentralized goods market;
therefore, h decreases. The terms of trade may also be adversely a¤ected for workers as the 7 See the work of Wright (2010) for a detailed analysis.
number of …rms selling consumption goods decreases. These e¤ects are aggregated to reduce the demand for real money balances z and thus to reduce the amount of goods traded q via the bargaining solution.
Another important result from (9) is that q < q for all i > 0, where q is the e¢ cient amount of goods traded, de…ned as v 0 (q ) = 1. In other words, the steady state is e¢ cient if and only if i = 0 and = 1. Intuitively, there are two types of ine¢ ciencies. First, workers do not always …nd a trading partner in the goods market. When it is costly to hold money, workers choose to carry less than the e¢ cient amount. In the second type of ine¢ ciency, the choice of …rms to bargain away part of the trading surplus also reduces the incentive to hold money. Invoking Proposition 1 of BMW, for i > 0, the LW curve slopes downwards in (u; q) space.
The Labor Market
To solve the labor market equilibrium condition (7) in terms of (u; q), we must …rst calculate the two wage levels w h and w l . As previously stated, the high wage in equilibrium is the wage at which the …rm is indi¤erent between employing a worker and not employing a worker:
. By contrast, the low wage is the wage at which a successful applicant is indi¤erent between employment status e = 1 and e = 0:
These two conditions allow us to solve w h and w l as a function of (u; q). The results are
) q], and (10)
Substituting the two wage levels expressed in (10) and (11) into the free entry condition (7) and then inserting d q = g(q) q by virtue of (8), we obtain
This equation is the general expression for the MP curve. To map the curve in (u, q) space, we must de…ne the matching functions
Consider a worker who is unemployed. If v vacancies are posted in the labor market, then the probability of the worker approaching a certain searching …rm is 1=v. The probability that the worker does not approach a certain …rm is 1 1=v. Then, the probability that the …rm is not approached by any unemployed workers is (1 1=v) u . The probability that exactly one worker approaches the …rm in the labor market, de…ned as the matching rate
is (1 1=v) u 1 , where = u=v is de…ned as labor market tightness. f 1 , the probability that more than one worker approaches the …rm in the labor market, is 1 (1 1=v)
For an unemployed worker to enter a high-wage contract, the worker must be the sole applicant at the …rm to which he or she applies to. The probability that the worker is the sole applicant is the probability that no other workers approach the …rm. Hence, h 2 is equal to
(1 1=v) u 1 . The probability of the worker entering a low-wage match, h 1 , is the probability of at least one other worker applying at the same …rm, 1 (1 1=v) u 1 , divided by the number of applicants. The average number of applicants at a …rm is best approximated by . Therefore,
This paper considers the e¤ect of in ‡ation on wage inequality in a large economy by holding constant and examining the case in which v is a large but …nite number. In this type of environment, the economy can be closely approximated by the limit economy in which v ! 1. 8 Using the rule that lim
(1 + x=v) v = e x , the labor market matching functions are,
(1 1=v) v 1 = e ; and (13)
8 For a more detailed analysis, see Julien et al (2000) .
Finally, the Beveridge curve (1 u) = u(
2 ) allows us to solve for and insert v = v(u) into the above matching functions. It is useful to note here that the Beveridge curve is downward sloping; that is, @v=@u < 0. This condition yields @ =@u > 0. A higher rate of unemployment, which simultaneously reduces the number of job vacancies available in the steady state, increases labor market tightness.
Substituting the matching functions (13) into equation (12), we obtain the …nal speci…-cation of the MP curve:
where is now u=v(u). This MP curve determines u by taking the value of money q as given. Here, we assume that
the labor market would simply shut down.
Di¤erentiating (14) provides the solution that dq=du is negative. The MP curve slopes downward in (u; q) space. The intuition is simple: there are three general e¤ects of an increase in u. First, it is easier for …rms to hire, f 1 increases; second, it is more di¢ cult for workers to become hired, h 2 decreases; third, it is easier for …rms to compete in the LW market, f increases. These three e¤ects encourage the entry of …rms. Thus, the equilibrium value of q must be reduced to ensure that the free entry condition holds. 
General Equilibrium
Results
We now consider the e¤ect of in ‡ation on wage inequality. Formally, we de…ne wage inequality as the ratio between the high wage w h and the low wage w l .
Di¤erentiating (15) Proposition 2 An increase in the rate of in ‡ation increases real wage inequality. Moreover, although both high and low wages decline with in ‡ation, the negative e¤ect is stronger on the low wage than on the high wage.
The intuition for this result is simple. From (10), it is evident that when in ‡ation increases, the quantity of goods traded in the LW market declines (Proposition 1), which leads to a decrease in trade surplus g (q) q. As this surplus decreases, …rms post fewer vacancies in the MP market, and the steady-state rate of unemployment increases. The labor market becomes tighter: the u=v ratio increases. We term this e¤ect a spillover e¤ect (a spillover from the goods market to the labor market). This e¤ect in turn increases the ease with which …rms (sellers) can meet workers (buyers) in the LW market; thus, f increases.
However, as suggested by the results, with reasonable parameter values the decrease in g (q) q dominates the increase in f ; therefore, the overall e¤ect on the real pro…ts of …rms from LW trades is negative, which explains why the high wage decreases in reaction to increases in in ‡ation.
With regard to low wages, from (11), it is evident that the low wage is a weighted average of workers'outside value b and the high wage w h (which is equal to a …rm's revenue R). As discussed above, when in ‡ation increases, the spillover e¤ect leads to a tighter labor market. lowers the weight that is assigned to w h , which, in addition to a reduced w h , places further downward pressure on the low wage. As the results suggest, with reasonable parameter values, the increase in the weight of b is insu¢ cient to compensate for the decrease in w h and the decrease in the weight of w h ; therefore, low wages always decline more than high wages. Thus, an increase in in ‡ation leads to an increased wage inequality.
Numerical Analysis
This section calibrates the model constructed in Section 3 to data for the United States.
Our objective is to analyze the extent to which our model can explain the observed e¤ect of in ‡ation on low wage w l , high wages w h , and the resulting wage inequality as measured by
Following BMW, the numerical analysis of this section uses the following speci…cations.
In the LW market, the utility function assumes the functional form of v (q) = Aq 1 a = (1 a), and the transformation cost function is c (q) = q . The matching function is assumed to be M (B; S) = BS= (B + S). Given these speci…cations, the parameters to be determined include preference parameters ( ; A; a), the technology parameters (y; k; ; ; ) and the policy parameter b.
Parameterization
The model period is set to be one quarter. The calibration targets that we choose are standard in the literature. As shown in Table 3 , we aim to reproduce the main features in the labor market, goods market and money market in the long term. The discount factor is set to match the annual real interest rate, which is 4:8%. In the model, the real demand for money M=(pY ) is measured by
The scale parameter A and curvature parameter a in the utility function jointly determine the value of M=(pY ) through the function of g (q); therefore, these two parameters are set to target the annual average real demand for money and the reaction to changes in the nominal interest rate (elasticity), which are 0:179 and 0:556; respectively, as reported by BMW. Because we focus on the steady-state analysis, the productivity in a formed match is , which determines the pro…t rate in the LW market. Hence, the value of is chosen to match the mark-up ratio, which is 30 percent, as summarized by Faig and Jerez (2005) . In the model, the mark-up ratio can be measured by
For policy parameters, the UI bene…t b is set to be 0:4, which is the value of the replacement ratio that is widely used in the literature (for example, in Shimer (2005) ). (9) and (14) . With some initial estimates for fA; a; k; g, we …t the observed nominal interest rate over the sample period into the system of equations, solve for the equilibrium values of fu; qg, and verify that the predictions of the model match the targets that are stated in Table 3 . If the predictions do not match, then the initial estimate is revised, and the above process is repeated until the predictions from the calibrated model appropriately match all of the targets. Table 4 reports the calibrated values of parameters fA; a; k; g. The values in the …rst column correspond to the baseline calibration as described above. The remaining four columns correspond to the alternative calibrations in which the targets for the key parameters b, and are changed. The values of b, and are crucial for understanding the e¤ects of in ‡ation on wage inequality. Equation (11) suggests that with a smaller b, the same change in in ‡ation imposes a greater downward pressure on low wage and thus results in increased wage inequality. When we increase the value of , it becomes more costly to produce goods in the goods market; with all else equal, this costliness reduces the real pro…ts of …rms and generates a stronger spillover e¤ect into the labor market. Finally, a increase in the mark-up ratio in the goods market reduces the quantity of goods traded in the LW market q, which reduces the incentives of …rms to post vacancies and translates into a higher unemployment rate. Because of the importance of these three parameters, we depart from the baseline calibration by changing their targets in the robustness check.
In the second column of Table 4 , which is termed Bene…ts, b is set to be zero. In the third column, which is called Curvature, is set to 1:1. In the fourth column, which is termed Markup, is determined to match the mark-up rate of 0:4 rather than 0:3. In the last column, which is labeled All, we simultaneously change the targets for all three parameters.
Although these alternative targets are arbitrarily set, they are useful to illustrate how the results depend on the parameter values. 
Results
Using the calibrated parameters, the …rst row in Table 5 reports the wage inequality predicted by the model. In the baseline model, the value is 1:16, which is approximately 75 percent of the empirical counterpart as calculated in Section 2 (1:16=1:54 = 0:75). The predicted value is fairly close to the observed wage inequality when all alternative targets are considered
(1:28=1:54 = 0:83). This result proves that the calibrated model is suitable for studying the e¤ects of in ‡ation on wage inequality.
The remaining three rows in Table 5 summarize the e¤ects of a doubled in ‡ation rate on low wages w l , high wages w h and wage inequality w h =w l in various cases as considered in the calibrations. To facilitate the comparison, we report their empirical counterparts (W I75 = wage75=wage25) in the last column of the table. Table 5 clearly shows that the model-predicted e¤ect on the levels of wages and wage inequality are qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence. A 100 percent increase in in ‡ation reduces both low and high wages but has a stronger e¤ect on low wages, which leads to increased wage inequality. For instance, in the baseline case, the low wage decreases by 3:08%, whereas the high wage decreases by only 2:94%. This result indicates that wage inequality increases by 0:14% in response to the change in in ‡ation. This …nding remains robust in all cases.
Quantitatively, in the baseline calibration, the predicted responses of low wages account for 80% of the observed movement ( 3:08% vs. 3:83%), and the predicted reactions of high wages is also fairly close to its empirical counterpart ( 2:94% vs. 2:61%). Departures from the baseline case by lowering the UI bene…ts and increasing the convexity of the cost function and the mark-up ratio contribute to enhancing the model …t. The table shows that when all modi…cations are made, the predicted responses of wage inequality account for approximately two-thirds of the observed adjustments in wage inequality as measured by W I75 (0:76=1:23 = 0:62).
Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the relationship between in ‡ation and residual real wage inequality.
Using the CPS data for the 1994 -2008 period, we …nd that in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on wage inequality among homogenous workers, and this in ‡uence is primarily observed in terms of a negative e¤ect on low wages. To explain these facts, we develop a model based on the search-theoretic monetary framework in BMW that features a variation of the wage-posting model in the work of Julien et al (2000) . Our model incorporates a capacity constraint and an uncoordinated job search, which are realistic features of economies.
We show that in ‡ation increases wage inequality, and the intuition is simple: in ‡ation reduces the real pro…ts of …rms, which is equal to the high wage. Because low wage in equilibrium is a weighted average of the high wage and the UI bene…ts, lower pro…ts also reduce the low wage. Furthermore, in ‡ation causes …rms to post fewer vacancies, which translates into a tighter labor market. As a result, it is less likely that unemployed workers will …nd high-wage jobs. This outcome reduces the weight of the high wage and increases the weight of the UI bene…ts, which places further downward pressure on the low wage.
When the model is tested with data for the United States, the qualitative predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence. Quantitatively, our model can explain approximately two-thirds of the observed adjustments in wage inequality.
A: The Current Population Survey The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of approximately 50,000 workers conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. To be eligible to participate in the CPS, individuals must be at least 15 years of age and must not serve in the Armed Forces. In general, one person ("reference person") responds on behalf of all eligible members of the family.
The original data set contains more than 200,000 person-level observations per month. To create our sample, we exclude all individuals who report zero hourly wages in their main job and individuals whose hourly wages are top-coded (i.e., greater than $99). We then obtain with approximately 2,000 individual observations per month during the period from 1994 to 2008.
B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. A di¤erentiation of (9) wrt the nominal interest rate, i, shows that dq di < 0 for a given u. Both the MP and LW curves are downward sloping. Given this result and considering that any change in i will not shift the MP curve (see equation (14)), we infer that an increase in i (which is equivalent to an increase in the in ‡ation rate) will cause a decrease in q and an increase in u.
Proof of Proposition 2. Because di¤erentiating (15) does not provide us closed-form solutions, we divide the analysis into two steps. First, we examine an alternative expression of (15) to gain a better understanding of how in ‡ation a¤ects wage inequality and wage levels. We de…ne g W I as g W I = w h b w l b
Substituting away w h and w l using equations (10) and (11) and then simplifying the results, we obtain g
It is immediately obvious that u is the only steady-state variable to appear in (16) . To consider the e¤ects of in ‡ation on g W I, we only need to consider the e¤ect of increased in ‡ation on the steady-state equilibrium value of u. It is routine to show that @ g W I @i > 0:
In the second step, we use the above result to solve for @(W I)=@i. There are two possible cases with regard to the e¤ects on wage levels and wage inequality. Case 1. w h decreases with in ‡ation. Because @( g W I)=@i > 0, it is suggested that w l must also decrease. The e¤ect on W I (which is de…ned as w h =w l ) is ambiguous. To more closely examine this relationship, we rewrite g
